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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Bob Boren pied guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm specifically preserving
his right to assert on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the charge.

Mr. Boren timely appeals from the district court's Judgment and

Commitment and Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment and asserts
that, mindful of the language contained in the challenged statutes and the applicable
standards of review, the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Boren with unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of
I.C. § 18-3316, based upon his knowing possession of firearms having been convicted
of two out-of-state felonies: possession of a controlled substance - delivery in the State
of Oregon in 1984, and possession of a controlled substance for purpose of sale in the
State of Nevada in 1988.

(R., pp.18-19.)

Counsel for Mr. Boren filed a Motion to

Dismiss and Memorandum Supporting the Motion to Dismiss.

(R., pp.27-31.)

Mr. Boren's basic argument was that pursuant to Idaho Code §18-310(2)(kk), because
his felonies occurred prior to 1991, his gun rights in Idaho were automatically restored
upon his final discharge from each felony case, despite the fact that his felonies
occurred in states other than Idaho. (R., pp.27-31.) The State countered that because
Mr. Boren's convictions were not Idaho convictions, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18310(4), his gun rights were not restored automatically, and he was required to file a

1

petition with the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole pursuant to I.C. § 18-310(3).
(Response Brief to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.) 1
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court agreed with the State's
interpretation of the relevant statutes and denied Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss.
(R., pp.39-44; Tr. 11/8/11.) Mr. Boren entered into conditional guilty plea to the charge
of felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to challenge the district court's
denial of his motion to dismiss on appeal; 2 in exchange, the State agreed to recommend
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended, with Mr. Boren
placed on probation. (R., pp.47-53; Tr. 12/20/11, p.1, L.4 - p.9, L.19.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Boren to a unified term of three years, with one year fixed, and placed
Mr. Boren on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.54-58, 62-65; Tr. 1/31/12,
p.30, Ls.8-14.) Mr. Boren filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.66-69.)

1

Mr. Boren has filed a Motion to Augment the record with the State's Response Brief to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Augment is pending.
2 Thus, Mr. Boren is precluded from raising any attacks to the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 18-310 in this appeal.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Boren's Motion to Dismiss?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss

A.

Introduction
Mindful of the language contained in the relevant statutes and the relevant

standards of review, Mr. Boren asserts that the district court erred by denying his Motion
to Suppress.

B.

Because His Convictions Pre-date 1991, And Because He Has Completed His
Sentences, Mr. Boren Is Not Subject To The Firearm Prohibition Imposed By
Idaho Code§ 18-3316(1)
Mr. Boren was charged with violation Idaho Code § 18-3316(1) which reads as

follows:
A person who previously has been convicted of a felony who purchases,
owns, possesses, or has under his custody or control any firearm shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of
time not to exceed five (5) years and by a fine not to exceed five thousand
dollars ($5,000)
I.C. § 18-3316(1). However, this section is modified by Idaho Code§ 18-3316(4) which
reads,

Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a person whose
conviction has been nullified by expungement, pardon, setting aside the
conviction or other comparable procedure by the jurisdiction where the
felony conviction occurred; or whose civil right to bear arms either
specifically or in combination with other civil rights has been
restored by any other provision of Idaho law.
I.C. § 18-3316(4) (emphasis added). Thus, a convicted felon may lawfully possess a
firearm in Idaho provided that their right to bear arms has been restored by provisions of
Idaho law.
Idaho Code § 18-310(1) provides that a sentence to the custody of the Idaho
state board of corrections suspends all civil rights, "provided further that any such
4

person may lawfully exercise all civil rights that are not political during any period of
parole or probation, except the right to ship, transport, possess or receive a
firearm, and the right to refuse treatment authorized by the sentencing court."
I.C. § 18-310(1) (emphasis added).

Thus, while a felon is under the custody of the

Idaho state board of corrections, that felon may not lawfully possess a firearm.
Furthermore, Idaho Code§ 18-310(2) provides,

Upon final discharge, a person convicted of any Idaho felony shall be
restored the full rights of citizenship, except that for persons convicted
of treason or those offenses enumerated in paragraphs (a) through
(jj) of this subsection the right to ship, transport, possess or receive
a firearm shall not be restored. As used in this subsection, "final
discharge" means satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and
parole as the case may be
I.C. § 18-310(2) (emphasis added). 3 Idaho Code § 18-310(3) allows a person to apply
to the commission of pardons and parole to have their right to possess a firearm
restored, at any time five years after final discharge. I.C. § 18-310(3). Thus, while most
of a convicted felon's civil rights are automatically restored upon final discharge, the
right to bear arms is not.
However, these provisions generally do not apply to people convicted of most of
the enumerated felonies (including delivery or possession with the intent to deliver a
controlled substance), if that conviction occurred prior to July 1, 1991, as § 18310(2)(kk) states,

The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to those persons
convicted of the enumerated felonies in paragraphs (a) through (jj) of
3

It was uncontested that Mr. Boren's prior out-of-state convictions are covered by this
code section. Idaho Code § 18-310(2)(dd), describes "felonious manufacture, delivery
or possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver, or possession of a controlled or
counterfeit substance (37-2732, Idaho Code)," which Mr. Boren concedes describes the
Idaho equivalent of felony possession of a controlled substance - delivery, as defined
by Oregon law, and possession of a controlled substance for purpose of sale, as
defined by Nevada law.
5

this subsection on or after July 1, 1991, except that persons convicted
of the felonies enumerated in paragraphs (s) and (t) of this subsection, for
any degree of murder or voluntary manslaughter, shall not be restored the
right to ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm regardless of the date
of their conviction if the conviction was the result of an offense committed
by use of a firearm.

I. C. § 18-310(2)(kk). Therefore, reading these provisions in pari materia people
convicted of felonies prior to July 1, 1991, have their right to possess firearms
automatically restored upon final discharge of their convictions. 4
However, Idaho Code§ 18-310(4) reads as follows:

Persons convicted of felonies in other states or jurisdictions shall be
allowed to register and vote in Idaho upon final discharge which means
satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and parole as the case
may be. These individuals shall not have the right restored to ship,
transport, possess or receive a firearm, in the same manner as an
Idaho felon as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
I.C. § 18-310(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the question presented to the district court
was whether, reading all of these statutes together, Idaho law treats individuals
convicted of felonies the same regardless of where their felony convictions occurred.
Mr. Boren argued the following during the hearing on his motion to dismiss:
And so it appears from [I.C. § 18-310] subsection (2) that we're
talking about people who have been convicted of Idaho felonies, which is
the argument the State presents in its brief.
However, ifwe turn to [1.C. § 18-310] subsection (4), it appears that
the legislature has anticipated the fact that it's only speaking about Idaho
felonies there, and it incorporates subsection (2) into subsection (4).
It says, "Persons convicted of felonies in other states or
jurisdictions shall be allowed to register and vote in Idaho upon final
discharge, which means satisfactory completion of imprisonment,
probation and parole, as the case may be. These individuals shall not
have the right restored to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm, in

4

It appears that prior to April 1, 1991, a convicted felon's right to possess firearms was
automatically restored, along with most other civil rights, upon final discharge. See
I.C. § 18-310 (1990).
6

the same manner as an Idaho felony as provided in subsection (2) of this
section."
Subsection (4) specifically references subsection (2) and says 'in
the same manner.' I think that's pretty clear language. I don't think
there's any ambiguity that's left there.
In other words, we're coming - we have to go full circle now. Now
we're talking about an out-of-state felony, and we're talking about an outof-state felony in subsection (4). Subsection (4) directs us to treat that in
the same manner as an Idaho felon in subsection (2).
So we return to subsection (2) with all of its enumerated felonies,
including [I.C. § 18-310(2)] subsection (kk). And subsection (kk) tells us
that this subsection applies to only persons convicted of the enumerated
felonies, but not the enumerated felonies if the conviction was before July
15 ', 1991.

I think the statute is very clear as to that. I don't think there's any
ambiguity here. If there were ambiguity - just for sake of argument, if
there were ambiguity in this statue, then the rule of lenity would require
that we interpret the statute in favor of the defendant when possible.
But I don't think there is ambiguity in this statute. I think the
statute's very clear. And given the fact that Bob Boren's felonies in this
case, only one of which the State has provided a judgment of conviction
on in this case, are before 1991.
And so I think it's very clear that this case should be dismissed and
that's what we ask the Court to do.
(Tr. 11/8/11, p.5, L.5 - p.7, L.2.)

The State argued that the statute unambiguously

distinguishes between those with Idaho felonies prior to 1991, and those with out-ofstate felonies prior to 1991 -

the former have their right to possess firearms

automatically restored upon final discharge, while the latter must seek relief through the
provisionsofl.C. § 18-310(3) (Tr.11/8/11, p.7, L.5-p.8, L.21.)
During the motion to dismiss hearing, the district court stated the following:
I think [I.C. § 18-310] subsection (4) draws a distinction between between persons convicted of felonies in other states in terms of
restoration of their voting rights versus the restoration of the right to
possess or receive a firearm.
7

It seems to do that, but if you look at the statement of purpose in
the session laws, which counsel haven't cited to those, but that would be
2004 Idaho Laws, Chapter 166, Felony Convictions, Restoration of Rights.
The Statement of purpose says, "This legislation clarifies the
restoration of voting rights of persons convicted of a felony in another
state or jurisdiction." And it doesn't say that it clarifies the restoration of
the right to possess or receive a firearm. It draws a distinction, I think,
between those two things.
My inclination - my inclination is to deny the motion based on - I
don't think it's that clear at all. But I mean, in terms of sorting through the
statute and what the statement of purpose seems to indicate, that the
legislature intended to draw a distinction between those two things.
So for purposes of moving forward, I think that what I'm going to is
tentatively deny the motion to dismiss, reserve the right to put something
in writing, but that is the answer.
(Tr. 11/8/11, p.9, L.14 - p.10, L.15.) In its written ruling, the district court found that "by
its express language, section 310(2) does not operate to restore Boren's right to bear
arms after final discharge from the alleged out-of-state convictions."

(R., p.42.)

Furthermore, the district court found, "by its express language, section 18-310(4) does
not operate to restore Boren's right to bear arms after final discharge from the alleged
out-of-state convictions." (R., p.42.) The district court, thus, denied Mr. Boren's motion
to dismiss. 5
Mr. Boren asserts that this Court should review his motion to dismiss de nova.
There is no dispute over the relevant facts of this case: Mr. Boren was convicted of

5

The thrust of the district court's ruling is Idaho law treats people with out-of-state
felonies less favorably in terms of restoration of Second Amendment rights than it treats
people with Idaho felonies.
Assuming but not conceding the district court's
interpretation is correct, Idaho Code § 18-310 is subject to a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection I right to travel constitutional challenge. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489 (1999); State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505 (2010). As this challenge was not made in
the district court and no right to raise such a challenge was preserved through his
conditional guilty plea, Mr. Boren reserves his right to raise this claim through postconviction proceedings.

8

felonies in states other than Idaho, prior to 1991; he has since been finally "discharged"
of those felonies have served all sentencing obligations; and, he possessed a firearm in
Canyon County on July 15, 2011. Mr. Boren asserts that the relevant statutes, Idaho
Code §§ 18-310 and 18-3316, show that his right to possess a firearm was
automatically restored upon his discharge of his prior felonies and; therefore, as a
matter law, he cannot be convicted of violating I.C. § 18-3316.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review by
an appellate court.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011).

The following

principles of statutory interpretation apply:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) (citing Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
147 Idaho 307, 310 (2009).) "'The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be
strictly construed in favor of defendants."' State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008)
(quoting State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 (1993) overruled on other grounds (citing

State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990))).

The power to correct a socially or

otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary. Verska v. St.

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011).
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Mindful of the express language contained in the relevant statutes and the
statutory construction rules articulated above, Mr. Boren asserts that the district court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

C.

By Application Of The Rule Of Lenity, The District Court Erred In Denying
Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss
Mr. Boren asserts that, too the extent that the statutory language is ambiguous,

the district court erred by failing to apply the "Rule of Lenity," which requires the court to
strictly construe a statute in a defendant's favor.

Thus, the district court erred in

denying Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Boren respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon, and to remand this case to the district court with
instructions that the charge be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2012.
1
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S N C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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